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COMMON SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON
GOOD: REFLECTIONS ON THE SCHOOL-
CHOICE DEBATE
RIcHARD W. GARNETT'
Thank you very much for this timely and important
discussion on school choice, religious faith, and the public good.
First things first-Steven Green is right: The Cleveland
school-voucher case is headed for the Supreme Court.' And I am
afraid that Mr. Green is also correct when he observes that the
question whether the First Amendment permits States to
experiment with meaningful choice-based education reform will
likely turn on Justice O'Connor's fine-tuned aesthetic reactions
to the minutiae of Ohio's school-choice experiment.
My own view is that her concurring opinion in Mitchell v.
Helms,2 read with and in light of her earlier opinion for the
Court in Agostini v. Felton,3 suggests strongly that she will vote
to uphold the Ohio program. More specifically, I believe that she
will conclude that the program uses religion-neutral criteria to
empower parents, that it is parents-not the government, who
select from a diverse menu of schools, public and private,
religious and secular-the option they believe is best for their
children, and therefore, that the choice experiment does not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause. And she will not, I predict,
credit the arguments that the number of religious schools
participating in the choice program, or the dollar amount of the
vouchers made available, or the desperation brought on by the
t J.D., Yale Law School; B-. Duke University. Assistant Professor of Law,
Notre Dame Law School.
1 Not long after this conference, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed a decision by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio that the Cleveland choice program violates the First
Amendments Establishment Clause. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945
(6th Cir., Dec 11, 2000). On September 25, 2001, the United States Supreme Court
agreed to review the case. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 23 (2001). As this
volume was going to press, oral argument in the case was set for February 20, 2002.
2 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
3 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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sorry state of Cleveland's public schools, somehow renders
parents' choices less-than-free, and therefore insufficient to
break the link between the government, on the one hand, and
the "coffers" of religious schools, on the other.
4
Putting aside for now the particulars of the Cleveland case,
though, I would like to propose for your consideration a few
thoughts on the notion of the "common good" and its implications
for the school-choice and education-reform debates. As you
know, I have been blessed with the chance to teach law at Notre
Dame, a Catholic school, and I suppose this is one reason why I
have acquired the habit of liberally sprinkling terms like "the
common good" atop my conversations about the Constitution, the
First Amendment, and the place of religion in the public square
of civil society. The term has, to be sure, a pleasant, pious, ring
to it. Not long ago, though, a colleague and friend of mine-
himself a formidable scholar in the law-and-religion area-
asked, with good-natured exasperation, "What does this 'common
good' business mean, anyway?"
This is a fair question. Terms like "the common good" are
often deployed as much for their gauzy connotations and
evocative pull as for their content. Stanley Fish has observed, in
his usual chiding manner, that "'free speech' is just the name we
give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we
wish to advance."5 By the same token, to invoke "the common
good" is often to do little more than send a less-than-subtle
announcement that, whatever the day's dispute, "I'm on the side
of the angels; I'm not selfish, I'm for 'the common good.'" So,
when we gather at conferences like this, and when we ask
whether law, religion, and education can or ought to cooperate to
serve the common good, what exactly are we talking about?
Take, for example, the issue of school choice. I have been
convinced-in no small part by my fellow panelist, Professor
4 In Establishment Clause cases having to do with private-school-funding
questions, it is common for courts to assume that religious schools-like pirate ships
or dragons' lairs, apparently-have "coffers," rather than "checking accounts." See,
e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 848, 867 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Agostini, 521 U.S. at
228; Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
5 STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND ITS A GOOD
THING, Too 102 (1994).
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Joseph Viteritti6-that our society generally, and poor children
in particular, would be well served by breaking the government's
monopoly on publicly funded education, by better respecting
religious freedom and family autonomy in schooling, and by
empowering all parents, regardless of income, to decide where,
what, and from whom their children will learn. In short, I
believe that school choice is a good idea, that it is just, and that
it is constitutional. Others disagree. In any event, though, if we
hope to make any progress in our now-over-150-years-old dispute
over which better serves the common good-parental control and
choice in education or government monopoly over public
education, we should take care to nail down our benchmark.
So, what is "the common good"? My answer is rooted in a
particular religious tradition-my own-but will not, I hope, be
dismissed as merely sectarian. For Roman Catholics, the
"common good embraces the sum of those conditions of social life
by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their own
fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way."7 It "chiefly
consists in the protection of the rights, and in the performance of
the duties, of the human person[,]"8 and "resides in the
conditions for the exercise of the natural freedoms indispensable
for the development of the human vocation."9
Now, there is a lot packed into those two sentences, and
some of my fellow speakers at this conference will likely have
more to say about the idea of the common good in Catholic social
teaching. Still, the little that I have said is enough to highlight
two noteworthy and relevant features of this complex idea:
First-and perhaps counter-intuitively-the "common good"
should be regarded as the means, not the end; and second, the
end toward which the common good is the means is not the well-
being of the state or the success of their various projects, nor is it
a utilitarian "greatest good for the greatest number." 0 It is,
6 See JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1999); see also Richard W. Garnett, Review
Essay, Brown's Promise, Blaine's Legacy, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 651 (2000)
(reviewing CHOOSING EQUALITY).
7 Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et spes, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 283-84
(Walter M. Abbott ed., Joseph Gallagher, Trans., 1966).
8 Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis humanae, in The Teachings of the Second Vatican
Council 366, 372 (1966).
9 THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1907 (1994).
10 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 154 (1980)
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instead, the authentic happiness of persons. That is, the
common good is that set of "conditions of social life" through
which we all--- "individuals, families, and groups"-enjoy our
rights, flourish, and become what we ought and are called to be.
It is the dignity of each particular human person-who thrives
in political community with others yet bears alone the "weight of
glory""--that ultimately serves as the benchmark for the
common good.
In other words, the Catholic understanding of the common
good is anti-statist, in that it incorporates the principle of
subsidiarity, and the insight that the person, the family, and the
mediating associations of civil society are prior in dignity and
right to the state; and it is personalist, in that its focus and end
is the authentic development of the human person in community
over the claims, goals, and values of government. The "common
good" question-in the school-choice context, as everyplace else-
is, in the end, an anthropological question; it is, "what is good for
the person?" and not, "what is good for the state?"
This thumbnail-sketch understanding of the common good
provides, I think, an interesting route into the contemporary
controversies about the place of religion in education and public
life generally, and about school choice specifically. For more
than a century now, the struggle between the state, on the one
hand, and parents, families, and civil society, on the other, for
control over children's education has been in large part the
struggle for the rhetorical and emotional power of terms like the
"common good" and the "common school." And it is this struggle
that has, perhaps more than anything else, but certainly more
than the text or history of the First Amendment, shaped the
courts' understanding and application of the Establishment
Clause in school-funding cases.
This means that the answer to the question, "does the First
Amendment permit school choice?," will likely end up depending
not so much on any imagined intent of the Framers to "erect a
'wall of separation between church and state,'"12 or on a
(observing that the notion that "the common good" is "the utilitarian 'greatest good
for the greatest number'" is "not merely practically unworkable but
intrinsically incoherent and senseless").
11 C.S. LEWIS, THE WEIGHT OF GLORY AND OTHER ESSAYS (Touchstone ed.
1996).
12 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947) ("The First Amendment has
erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high
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supposed Founding-era consensus around the views of James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, or Roger Williams, or on any
particular "first principles" of religious freedom, 13 but instead on
the degree to which the Court remains willing to
constitutionalize the views of those for whom the mission of
religious (primarily Catholic) schools is at odds with their
understanding of the common good and the mission of the
"common schools." Thus, the case for choice requires its
supporters to re-focus on, re-define, and, in a sense, re-claim the
common good as our standard.
Now, as I said a few minutes ago, it is clear to me that the
current canon of relevant precedent permits-and probably
requires-the Supreme Court to hold that school choice is
constitutional. This is the right answer. But it is not the right
answer only because it is where we should arrive after tracing
our way through fifty years of zig-zagging caselaw, from
Everson,14 through Mueller'5 and Witters,16 to Mitchell.17 It is
also the right answer because it coheres best with the better
view of the common good. After all, properly understood, school
choice is not simply a matter of spurring improvements through
competition, or even about delivering publicly funded education
in a fairer way, especially to low-income and minority students;
it is about authentic religious, political, and personal freedom. It
is not just about solving in a cost-effective fashion the
government's problems or meeting its asserted need for well-
trained workers and citizens, but about promoting the dignity
and flourishing of parents and children, in families and
communities. Understood in this way, school choice is, I believe,
one of those "conditions of social life by which individuals,
families, and groups can achieve their own fulfillment in a
relatively thorough and ready way." 8
and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.").
13 See JOHN WITTE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 37-55 (2000).
14 Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
15 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
16 Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
17 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
18 Pope Paul VI, supra note 7.
20011 223
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Few have engaged questions about education, the
Constitution, and the common good as thoughtfully and
provocatively as did John Courtney Murray. The reflections of
this once-controversial Roman Catholic priest on the American
experience of democracy, pluralism, and freedom-set out in his
1960 volume, We Hold These Truths-were enormously
influential in the production of the Second Vatican Council's
Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis humanae.
The Council opened in October of 1962. More than a decade
before the Council, though, the United States Supreme Court in
Everson had constitutionalized a strange brew of rational
religion, strict separationism, and anti-Catholicism, stating that
"W[the First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable."19 The
Court re-affirmed this approach the next year in McCollum.
20
In response to these landmark decisions, the respected
Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems hosted a
symposium-much like this one-on the First Amendment and
the role of religion in American public life. Murray was one of
the participants. True, he was not, as he was quick to note, a
lawyer, but no matter: 'The constitutional law written in the
Everson and McCollum cases is obviously not what is called
learned law; consequently, one who is not a lawyer, learned in
the law, may speak his mind on it." 21 The title of Murray's
essay, Law or Prepossessions?, was taken from Justice Jackson's
opinion in McCollum, and it reflected Murray's conclusion that,
in both cases, the Court's holding and history were made, not
found. As he put it, in Everson and McCollum, "The First
Amendment has been stood on its head. And in that position it
cannot but gurgle nonsense."22
Re-reading Murray's essay, and reflecting on it in the
context of contemporary discussions about education, state
power, religion, and the idea of the common good, I was struck
both by Murray's prescience, and also by how little the terms of
the debates have changed. Our string-cites and footnotes are
longer today, but those of us who litigate or write in these areas
19 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
20 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
21 John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 J.L. CONTEMP. PROBS.
23, 23 (1949).
22 Id. at 33.
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today could go back fifty years and feel right at home at the Law
and Contemporary Problems symposium with Murray and his
colleagues.
Murray offered in his essay four "conclusions"23 with respect
to the Everson and McCollum decisions specifically, and the
Court's approach to the Establishment Clause and education
more generally. Each of these short reflections is, even today,
remarkably rich; each could serve as a subject for detailed study.
Today, though, the following brief comments will have to suffice.
First, Murray observed, before it was common to observe,
that neither the Establishment Clause story told in the Everson
and McCollum opinions, and on which the Court purported to
build its "wall of separation" metaphor, nor the metaphor itself,
can be taken seriously. As he stated, "When one has performed
the very modest feat of scholarship involving in mastering the
historical data that determine the meaning of the First
Amendment as first formulated and ratified, one is driven to the
conclusion that, if [the Justices] are essaying history, it is only in
a Voltairean sense. The tricks they plan on the dead are
astonishing."24 I agree. The First Amendment had never meant
previously what it meant the day after Everson was decided.25 I
would say that the account in Everson is a "myth," too often
embraced, except that I am inclined to agree with C.S. Lewis's
observation that myths are stories aimed at pointing us toward
the truth.
26
This is not to say that I know what the Establishment
Clause really means, either, or even that I know exactly which
interpretive tools I should be employing to help me resolve the
23 Id. at 40. Murray concluded: (1) the Court's decisions in Everson and
McCollum are "unsupported, and unsupportable by valid evidence and reasoning";
(2) the "relationship of separation to the free exercise of religion is destroyed"; (3) "in
the field of education, the result is juridical damage to the freedom of religion and to
the natural rights of parents"; and (4) "this damage is particularly harmful in the
existent religious and educational situation ... the Court has sided with the wrong
set." Id.
24 Id. at 28.
2 See id at 40 ("The absolutism of [Everson] ... is unsupported, and
unsupportable, by valid evidence and reasoning-historical, political, or legal-or on
any sound theory of values, religious or social."). cf Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is impossible to build sound constitutional
doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of Constitutional history.... ").
26 See C.S. LEWIS, MIRACLES: A PRELIMINARY STUDY 161 n.1 (1947) (Myth is
the "real though unfocused gleam of divine truth falling on human imagination").
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matter. My colleague Steven Smith has argued that the
Establishment Clause embodies no single theory of church-state
relations, and enshrined in national law no particular fixed
principles of religious liberty. Instead, the Clause is a
jurisdictional provision-nothing more, nothing less-designed
to leave the matter of church-state relations in the hands of the
States' legislatures. 27 This seems plausible to me.
Still, notwithstanding doubts about my own grasp of the
Clause's true meaning, I am fairly sure that Murray was right,
and that the Everson and McCollum Justices' breezy certitude
that the First Amendment constitutionalized their particular
brand of separationism, and their particular notion of religion, is
unfounded. I am convinced that the results in these cases, and
the stories they tell about religion, education, and government,
have their roots less in the Framing of the Constitution than in
the nativism and anti-Catholicism of the Common School
movement, the rise of the Know Nothing Party, and the failed
campaign for the Blaine Amendment.28 If this is true, then to
understand Everson will require that we turn our attention from
Madison to, for example, the anti-immigrant backlash of the
1920s, which spawned a variety of homogenizing education-
related enactments and eventually prompted the Supreme Court
in Pierce29 and Meyer30 to vindicate the fundamental right of
parents to choose to educate their children in private religious
schools. And, to understand the opinions of Justices Black and
Rutledge, we will need to confront the then-still-powerful
influence of what Mark DeWolfe Howe called the "de facto
Protestant establishment,"31 and re-appreciate the fact that, as
my colleague John McGreevy has observed,32 Everson was
decided against a backdrop of widespread elite suspicion toward
Catholicism, Catholic schools, and the motives and capacities of
Catholic voters.
27 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
See generally, VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 6, at 145-79;
CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); LLOYD P.
JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL 1825-1925 (1987).
29 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
30 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
31 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, A GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 31 (1965).
32 John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American
Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 84 J. AM. HIST. 97 (1997).
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So, what if Everson did not incorporate the considered
judgment of those who drafted and ratified the First Amendment
but rather "laundered" the anti-popery of later times? Then
what? Will the United States Supreme Court be willing to
admit, perhaps in a school-choice case, that for over fifty years it
has been on the wrong track, distinguishing and re-
distinguishing cases built on unsound foundations? I do not
know. That said, Justice Thomas's recent plurality opinion in
Mitchell v. Helms could well have set us on the road to recovery
when he acknowledged the unattractive origins of the Court's
practice of treating "pervasively sectarian" schools as suspect
participants in public-welfare programs. As he stated,
"Opposition to aid to 'sectarian' schools acquired prominence in
the 1870's with Congress's consideration (and near passage) of
the Blaine Amendment .... Consideration of the amendment
arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and
to Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that 'sectarian'
was code for 'Catholic.' This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be
buried now."33
Second, Murray insisted that Everson and McCollum did
not, by constitutionalizing their version of separationism, reject
the imposition of sectarian orthodoxy. Instead, the Justices
established just such an orthodoxy. As Justice Rutledge
observed, Madison's views-echoed and endorsed by the
Justices-rested on the premise that "religion [is] wholly a
private matter."34 But this is a theological claim: In Murray's
words, the "ultimate ground" of "Madison's concept of separation
of church and state" is "a religious absolute, a sectarian idea of
religion .... And no other grounds may be assigned for its
absoluteness but its theological premise."35
To state that true religion is privatized religion is to make a
religious statement. The claim might be correct, but it is still
religious. Murray noted the irony that "[i]n order to make
separation of church and state absolute, [the Court] unites the
state to a 'religion without a church'-a deistic view of
3 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
3 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39 (1947). For a powerful and insightful
critique of the "privatization" of religion wrought by the Court's Religion Clause
decisions, see Gerard V. Bradley, Dogrnatomachy: A 'Privatization" Theory of the
Religion Clause Cases, ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275 (1986).
35 Murray, supra note 21, at 30.
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fundamentalist Protestantism."36 He insisted, though, that,
given the Justices' premises, "[i]t is not more legitimate to adopt
Madison's particular theory of religion in its relation to
organized society"3 7 than for the state to endorse any other
religious dogma.
Here, Murray seems to have anticipated Cardinal
Bevilacqua's remarks earlier today about the contemporary and
pervasive expectation that faith is and should be, by its very
nature, private. Even the promotional materials for this
conference assert that "religion was once considered a deeply
personal matter," though believers are today starting to engage
the world. If Murray were here, I imagine he would remind us
that the notion that religious faith is "purely private," and
something to be checked at the door of civil society by believers
who venture into the controversies of public life, is both bizarre
and ahistorical. Certainly, for much of our history and for many
believers today, religious faith has not been, and cannot be,
"purely private," but instead inspires and requires public
worship, civic engagement, and community-transforming
activity. In Dignitatis humanae, for instance, we read that the
"social nature of man itself requires that he should give external
expression to his internal acts of religion" and that "he should
profess his religion in community."38 And so, while a consensus
might well have emerged at the time of the Founding around the
institutional separation of church and state, such separation was
rarely, if ever, thought to require what Richard John Neuhaus
has called a "naked public square." 9 In Murray's view, the First
Amendment was not thought to disable government from
creating a climate in which religious faith and religious freedom
could thrive. Quite the contrary: "Separation of church and
state.., is simply a means, a technique, a policy to implement
the principle of religious freedom."40
Now, it could be that Murray overemphasizes the
instrumental nature of the First Amendment's non-
36 Id. at 31.
37 Id.
38 Dignitatis humanae, supra note 8, 3.
39 RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 25 (1984) ("In everyday fact, people do not and cannot
bifurcate themselves so at one moment they are thinking religiously and at another
secularly, so to speak.").
40 Murray, supra note 21, at 32.
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establishment norm. Still, his observation rings true: an
excessively privatized and individualistic notion of religion was
constitutionalized in Everson and continues to shape
constitutional doctrine today. The Court would do well to re-
visit this view. If religious freedom is-and it is-one of those
"conditions of social life" that is essential to authentic personal
fulfillment, then the common good-not merely the privatized,
behind-the-doors good of individuals, but the common good that
helps promote authentic freedom for all-might be better served
by Murray's views than by the "prepossessions" enacted in
Everson.
Third, Murray was concerned that the Court's "absolute"41
approach threatened to obscure, and even to denigrate, the
longstanding and important mission of religious schools. The
Court seemed in Everson and McCollum to stamp its approval on
the notion that education is the province and charge of the state,
not the family or parents. We read in these opinions lofty,
almost religious, paeans to the "unifying" role of government
schools, coupled with warnings about the dangers of division
posed by their "sectarian" counterparts.42  The Court
constitutionalized the century-old rhetoric of the Common School
movement, its Progressive successors, and school-choice
opponents, and bestowed the mantle of "unifier" on the
government's public-school monopoly.
But, as Murray took care to emphasize, the Court got things
backwards, reversing the place of parents and state in the
educational arena. The role of the former was seen as providing
the raw materials for, and supporting the task of, the latter,
rather than vice-versa. A quarter-century earlier, though, in
Pierce, the Court had held that parents' right and duty to "direct
and control" the upbringing and education of their children
trumps the standardizing aims of the state.43 The Second
Vatican Council sounded the same theme in Dignitatis humanae,
insisting that "government... must acknowledge the right of
parents to make a genuinely free choice of schools." 44 This right,
for Murray, is the "pivotal point of a democratic system." Yet,
"nlike the smile on some sort of disembodied educational Cheshire
41 Murray, supra note 21, at 40.
42 See, e.g., McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 214 (1948).
43 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
44 Pope Paul VI, supra note 8.
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cat, [it] begins to fade under the Court's unsettling stare."45
Here, as elsewhere, Murray has proved remarkably
prescient. An observer of or participant in the lively education-
and-democracy debate can only be struck by the degree to which
the statist education themes of the Common School and
Progressive movements have re-surfaced in the "civic
republicanism" of a number of prominent scholars. 46 It is said
that the liberal state may, should, and must take charge of the
task of citizen creation in order to guarantee the development of
a deliberative temperament and liberal tolerance.
Notwithstanding Pierce (the heart of which was re-affirmed in
Troxel v. Granville47), it is safe to say that elite opinion tends to
regard religious schools with, at best, condescending or wary
tolerance and, increasingly, with suspicion or even hostility.
More and more, it is accepted as given that the state has a moral
right and obligation to make sure the child becomes what the
state wants the child to be. But this is not the function of
education, nor would education, so conceived, really serve the
overriding end of the common good, namely, enabling all of us to
become the persons we ought to be.
48
And so, when it takes up the school-choice question, the
Court ought to jettison Everson's baggage-its bad history, its
hidden religious preferences, and its unease with parochial
schools-and confront squarely the degree to which a baseline of
government monopoly in education was mistakenly
constitutionalized, and to bad effect. It ought to haul into
daylight the extent to which the government schools' monopoly,
and the precedents that support it, have compromised the First
Amendment rights and fundamental constitutional liberties of
religious families who cannot afford the price of exit. And it
should first expose and then reject the statist premise of choice
opponents that education is the charge of government, and that
government-supervised education in the government's schools
are the baseline from which any departure must be justified.
Finally, Murray was, once again, ahead of his time in
45 Murray, supra note 21, at 36.
46 See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CiIC EDUCATION IN
A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000).
47 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
48 See generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul:
Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001).
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warning that the Court in Everson had turned its back on
genuine pluralism, and instead taken sides on contested
questions, to advance its ersatz ideal of unity. Murray was
appropriately skeptical of the "fuzzy mysticism" 9 that seemed to
emanate from the Court's discussions of the unifying role of
government education. We should be, too. Murray could have
been speaking today when he stated that "[wihatever spiritual
mission of promoting unity government may have, it is
conditioned... by its primary duty of promoting justice,
guaranteeing an order of rights, [and] insuring the equality of
differences."50 Responding to the Justices' apparent fear of
religious "pressures" being brought to bear on children in public
schools, and of the "divisiveness" that must inevitably
accompany such pressures, Murray noted that "this naivet6 is
too extreme to be credible."51 After all, "the atmosphere of the
public schools is not free from pressures .... In fact, the whole
weight of the system tends to be thrown against the children's
religious conscience."
52
Here again, Murray is speaking directly to the contemporary
school-choice debate. Of course children should not be coerced or
pressured by government into religious observance. But neither
should they be discouraged, distracted, or confused by
government if they and their families desire to integrate such
observance into their lives. With respect to religion, school
choice imposes on no one; it simply lifts the burden of dis-
integration that the government's schools tend to place on those
who cannot afford to leave.
I have tried to suggest that Murray's half-century-old essay
has as much, if not more, to add to our conversations about
education reform as does the usual "parse the cases" analysis of
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause precedents. As I
mentioned at the outset, the Court should permit carefully
crafted choice plans to proceed, though my purpose has not been
to provide a sneak preview of the amicus curiae brief that I will
file when the time comes. Yes, Mr. Green and I-and many
49 Murray, supra note 21.
50 Id. at 38.




others, too-will continue to distinguish and re-distinguish cases
like Nyquist,53 Mueller, and Witters. Still, I wonder if the
enterprise will really be anything but a sport until we rethink
our ideas about education and the common good, in light of the
anti-statist and personalist values mentioned earlier.
School choice is constitutional. It serves the common good,
though not just because the government, the state, or the
community benefits. Instead, as I have tried to suggest, building
on Murray's observations, it is because choice in education both
promotes and is an expression of religious freedom. It coheres
with a proper and limited notion of the government's role in
education, and does not confuse the good of the state with that of
the person. In the end, it is, I submit, no less than one of "the
conditions for the exercise of the natural freedoms indispensable
for the development of the human vocation."54
53 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
54 THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1907 (1994).
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